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ABSTRACT
In his recent book, Just Enough, Liam Shields offers a novel defense of the 
Principle of Sufficient Autonomy. According to this principle, each citizen 
is owed ‘enough’ powers of deliberation and scope for decision-making as 
a matter of justice in order to satisfy our fundamental interest in acting 
and believing freely. In this article, I offer two objections against this view. 
The first objection challenges the plausibility of the principle. I argue that 
the principle that Shields derives from our interest in freedom will struggle 
to secure the proper protection for our capacities for autonomous behavior 
that many autonomy-minded liberals would expect the principle to 
provide. The second objection challenges the distinctiveness of the 
principle. I argue that Shields’ defense cannot successfully dismiss all of its 
competitors and I offer an account of constitutive welfarism to illustrate 
this point.
Keywords: sufficiency, personal autonomy
1. INTRODUCTION
Theories of distributive justice cannot avoid questions concerning the 
value of choice and our capacities for autonomous decision-making in 
modern society. For example, we need to know how accessible our 
opportunities for valuable choice should be, how the opportunities to 
develop our decision-making capacities should be distributed between us, 
and how sensitive the distribution of goods and services should be to our 
individual choices. In his recent book, Just Enough, Liam Shields offers us 
a series of novel arguments that can help us answer these important 
questions.1
1 All in text references refer to this text.
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Shields argues that we have a fundamental interest in enjoying the 
conditions of freedom; conditions under which our actions and beliefs can 
be considered freely taken (52). Each citizen requires sufficient autonomy 
in order to satisfy this interest because we each require some autonomy in 
order for our choices to be considered freely made by ourselves as agents. 
Our interest in freedom thus establishes the need for a Principle of Sufficient 
Autonomy. 
This principle requires citizens to be: (a) well-informed, (b) able to 
give reasons for one’s views, and (c) disposed to exchange reasons and 
participate in a public deliberative process with others (53). Fulfilling 
these three satiable conditions secures ‘enough’ autonomy, understood in 
terms of: (i) the citizen’s powers of deliberation, and (ii) the scope of the 
decisions over which he or she decides (50).
This principle maintains a conception of autonomy that is framed in 
terms of an ideal of living one’s life in accordance with one’s own authentic 
judgements (47). It emphasizes the role that critical deliberation plays in 
establishing our capacity for self-rule (51) and concerns itself with avoiding 
threats to this capacity (especially threats of alien control that circumvent 
this capacity, such as coercion and manipulation) (48). This principle is 
relatively thin in its content and moderate in its demands.2 It primarily 
focuses on establishing the conditions of authentic belief-formation and 
an ethos of well-informed and tolerant decision-making (53).
Shields’ principle of sufficient autonomy is notable for two reasons. 
First, his defense of a sufficientarian principle of personal autonomy is 
distinctive. The relationship between personal autonomy and sufficiency 
has been defended in various ways. This relationship is most commonly 
cashed out in terms of option sets. For example, Joseph Raz (1986: 373-7) 
famously argues that personal autonomy requires agents to enjoy an 
adequate range of objectively valuable options. Gerald Dworkin (1988: 
62-81) defends an adequacy limit on option sets according to a range of 
moral and rational considerations. Kerah Gordon-Solmon (2017) has 
recently offered a satisfaction-based defense of an adequacy limit on 
option sets grounded in the value of autonomy. However, this relationship 
has been explained in other ways. For example, Ben Colburn (2010: 89-92) 
defends a responsibility-sensitive threshold for autonomous capacities, 
below which we should not be held responsible for deficits in autonomy. 
Although these arguments differ in their grounding or target, they all 
2 For example, Shields’ principle has relatively little to say about the structure of 
autonomous motivation, limits on the validity of motivating factors, substantive constraints 
on option selection, relational constraints on the standing of autonomous agents, or limits 
on consent’s role as a normative power.
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serve to defend autonomy-sensitive principles of sufficiency as Shields 
understands the notion (i.e. as a shift or discontinuity in the rate of change 
in our marginal reasons to promote autonomy). Shields’ argument is an 
important addition to this discourse. It distinguishes itself from preceding 
arguments by appealing to the Rawlsian higher-order interest in the social 
conditions of freedom as conditions capable of securing our freedom and 
equality as moral persons (52).
Second, the principle serves a pair of important functions in Shields’ 
general argument for sufficientarianism. Shields primarily defends the 
principle as a central example of the indispensability of sufficientarianism 
to a sound and complete theory of distributive justice (26). In order to 
prove this, Shields identifies sufficientarian reasons as a distinctive type of 
non-instrumental, non-egalitarian, weighty, and satiable reason (44). He 
then sets out to prove that we cannot do without these distinctive reasons 
in the most plausible account of justice by showing that these reasons 
support principles that are more plausible than their rivals (17). Our reason 
to secure sufficient autonomy, and the principle that this reason supports, 
is a central example of this larger thesis. 
The principle plays a further role as a significant bridging argument 
between Shields’ general defense of sufficientarianism and his subsequent 
claims concerning the specific role of sufficientarian principles in 
education. He suggests that the fact that we owe sufficient autonomy to all 
should inform how we justify education for autonomy to groups who reject 
autonomy’s value, how we educate in order to facilitate the discovery and 
development of talents, and how we conceive of the broader requirements 
of fair equality of opportunity (83).
The reasons why Shields’ principle is notable are the very same reasons 
that motivate this study of his explanation and defense of the principle. His 
argument takes the form of a two-stage defense; first of the principle’s 
content and then of its standing against competing principles. In this 
article, I offer a two-stage criticism that mirrors this strategy. First, I will 
object to the thinness of the principle and the protection of our capacity for 
autonomous behavior that it provides. I will then object to an important 
deficiency in his defense of the relative plausibility of his principle against 
its competitors.
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2. THE FIRST OBJECTION – CAN THE PRINCIPLE ACHIEVE 
ITS AIMS?
Shields motivates his principle according to our interest in the conditions 
of freedom. This locates the principle of autonomy downstream from the 
interest in the conditions of freedom. This relationship explains why it is 
no objection to argue that the principle of sufficient autonomy does not 
provide us with enough autonomy to secure freedom. The proper role of 
the principle is not to secure all of the freedom that we might need. Rather, 
we can secure freedom through a number of principles, one of which must 
be the principle of sufficient autonomy. 
However, we can legitimately object that the principle of sufficient 
autonomy, as it stands, does not provide us with all of the autonomy that 
our interest in the conditions of freedom should secure for us. This is the 
worry that I will press in this section. I argue that Shields’ principle offers 
less protection for our capacities for autonomous behavior than it should, 
given that it is derived from our interest in freedom. This, in turn, leads us 
to question whether our interest in freedom is a satisfactory grounding for 
principles of autonomy.
This objection rests on the different ways in which our free and 
autonomous behavior can be hindered. Suppose that I sit down to write a 
short philosophy article. There are a variety of ways in which my decision 
to do so can fail to successfully translate into action through no fault of my 
own. 
Shields’ explanation of these failures explicitly focusses on the social 
conditions that influence our belief formation (53). He distinguishes 
between coercion (47) and other failures of self-direction that are the result 
of external forces acting on our beliefs (48). A long-suffering and frustrated 
neighbor who barges in to snatch up my notes and prevent me from writing 
is an example of the former. A manipulative neighbor who tricks me into 
giving up writing for the afternoon and going out for an enjoyable (though 
ultimately regrettable) walk instead is an example of the latter. Shields 
identifies both phenomena as possible threats to our autonomy because in 
both cases we are unfree to act or decide otherwise. 
The principle of sufficient autonomy is intended to respond to these 
threats to our free and autonomous behavior by securing the social 
conditions under which our beliefs and actions can be considered freely 
taken (53). As we have seen, the principle focuses on the conditions of 
belief-formation (51), and in particular on an agent’s powers of deliberation 
and the scope of the decisions over which he or she decides (50). This focus 
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generates the requirement that citizens are: (a) well-informed, (b) able to 
give reasons for their views, and (c) disposed to exchange reasons and 
participate in a public deliberative process with others. With this in mind, 
let us question whether Shields’ distinction between coercion and other 
external threats acting on our beliefs is exhaustive and plausible. I suggest 
that it is not for the following reasons.
First, while it is true that my decision to write can be circumvented by 
some competing heteronomous motivation, it is not true that this 
motivation must stem from external forces. For example, I could deceive 
myself into over-estimating my writing ability and mistakenly lead myself 
into putting off my work for another day. Alternatively, a bout of hysteria or 
ambivalence may drive me to throw my notes out of the nearest window. In 
these instances, my initial intention to spend the afternoon writing has 
been foiled by a pernicious influence that leads to an inauthentic change 
of plan. I will subsequently become alienated from these decisions and 
come to authentically reject and regret them, just as I would if they were 
the product of external manipulation. Of course, it is well within my ability 
to change my mind as an autonomous agent and freely decide not to spend 
the afternoon writing. But there are troubling manifestations of this 
change of character that subvert my authentic will and are thus 
incompatible with my free and autonomous choice. Crucially, not all of 
these threats to my autonomy come from external sources, such as my 
neighbor.
Second, while it is true that my decision can successfully motivate me 
to act but that my motivation can still be subsequently frustrated by 
coercion (thus preventing me from acting), it is not true that coercion is the 
only phenomena that can frustrate my behavior in this way. For example, I 
may misplace my pen, fail to wrestle my notes out of the clutches of my pet, 
or be plunged into darkness thanks to a broken lightbulb. In these 
instances, no other agent has frustrated my autonomous decision to write. 
Rather, frustration is the result of simply lacking the option to perform the 
act that I had autonomously chosen to perform. It is frustration, rather 
than coercion, that prevents me from behaving authentically in these 
cases. Frustration can occur by either natural accident or inter-personal 
sabotage. While extreme forms of frustration should not concern us (e.g. 
the irrational desire to perform the impossible), some forms of non-
coercive frustration clearly threaten our free and autonomous 
decision-making.
Circumvention and frustration come apart in a similar manner to 
Shields’ own distinction between coercion and other external threats to 
our autonomy. Indeed, frustration will similarly occur in the absence of 
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circumvention as the latter precedes the former in the chain of action. 
However, both circumvention and frustration are broader than Shields’ 
categories of coercion and other external threats. As a result, if you agree 
that my distinction provides a more plausible and comprehensive 
explanation of the various threats to our autonomy that we face, then you 
may worry that Shields’ principle of sufficient autonomy does a poor job of 
protecting our authentic decisions against internal threats (such as self-
deception) or non-interpersonal external threats (such as bad luck). As a 
result, the principle appears to do a poor job at protecting our autonomy 
from threats that Shields ignores. 
This objection is similar in form to Shields’ own objection against John 
Rawls. In his discussion of Rawls’ argument from the interest in freedom, 
Shields notes a possible ambiguity. Shields interprets Rawls’ argument to 
support the possibility of achieving a sufficient level of autonomy as one 
important option that should be open to citizens. This is too small a 
commitment from Rawls. Our interest in freedom does not merely require 
the possibility of achieving sufficient autonomy, but rather the actual 
achievement of sufficient autonomy (55). Without the actual achievement 
of sufficient autonomy, we cannot know that each citizen’s decision 
whether or not to live an autonomous life is itself free. Given that our 
interest in freedom suggests that we should strive to make sure that our 
adoption of an autonomous lifestyle is itself freely chosen, we require a 
larger commitment from Rawlsians in their defense of sufficient autonomy.
Shields’ defense of the principle of sufficient autonomy is guilty of the 
same failing for which he dismisses Rawls’ argument; at best, Shields’ 
argument is necessary but not sufficient for establishing the conclusion 
that he wishes to draw. While it is true that the threats that he identifies are 
likely threats to autonomy, there are other threats to autonomy that should 
plausibly be recognized as contrary to our interest in freedom.
Shields may respond to this objection in one of two ways: he may 
concede by fleshing out his argument to encompass further types of threat. 
Alternatively, he may resist by rejecting the notion that non-interpersonal 
threats (such as internal threats or accidents) threaten our freedom. 
According to this response, he has not mistakenly ignored a range of likely 
threats. Rather, freedom is a question of interpersonal interactions not 
opportunities for autonomous action. For this reason, non-interpersonal 
threats should not be covered by a principle of sufficient autonomy that is 
grounded in our interests in freedom. Those of us who are concerned with 
protecting further opportunities for autonomous action can look to other 
compatible reasons to promote autonomy (45), but Shields’ focus on 
securing enough autonomy results from his core sufficientarian reason, 
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and this reason only concerns interpersonal threats (that is, threats to our 
interest in freedom from other agents). Therefore, Shields’ principle is 
rightly insensitive to non-interpersonal concerns. 
This response is important because it shifts our gaze to the deeper 
question concerning the justification of his principle. Sceptics may meet 
him here by denying the downstream relationship and arguing that our 
autonomy is threatened by more than a mere loss of freedom and therefore 
Shields’ principle is incorrectly justified. Both circumvention and 
frustration undermine our autonomy and, by doing so, prevent us from 
enjoying the conditions of freedom in line with our authentic conception 
of the good. We cannot pursue the opportunities afforded to us in line with 
our authentic wishes if we are constantly self-sabotaging or suffering from 
a pronounced mismatch between our preferences and our option set.3 
Therefore, his principle is too thin because its justification is wrong. 
Autonomy tells us which freedoms matter, not the other way around.
Sceptics may conclude that Shields’ principle only offers us an 
incomplete defense of our autonomy because he derives it from an interest 
in interpersonal considerations of freedom. This conclusion explains why 
Shields’ principle is likely to be attractive to Rawlsians (who may share the 
same conception and weighting of our interest in freedom) but unattractive 
to other autonomy-minded liberals who worry about a broader set of 
threats to our autonomy.4 Seen in this light, the feature that makes Shields’ 
argument distinctive is also a limitation. 
3. THE SECOND OBJECTION – IS THE PRINCIPLE 
PREFERABLE TO ITS COMPETITORS? 
Having questioned the content of Shields’ principle, I now turn to his 
defense of its relative plausibility against competing principles. Shields’ 
rebuttal of his competitors first rejects rival distributive schemes of 
3 These issues combine in cases of adaptive preferences. As fans of famous fables 
involving foxes will know, the fox that cannot reach the nearby bunch of grapes may 
mistakenly conclude that they must be sour, and thus undesirable. Of course, adaption 
cases need not be so far-fetched. But even mundane versions of this phenomena can threaten 
our autonomy. Crucially, the grapes need not be lifted out of reach by a devious neighbour 
for our out-of-character decision to override our preferences. Rather, the mere absence of an 
option can trouble autonomous decision-making. For discussion, see Elster (1983); Colburn 
(2011); Christman (2014); Stoljar (2014); Cudd (2014).
4 As a reviewer helpfully suggests, the Rawlsian’s support will hinge on how they 
view Shields’ interpretation of the higher-order interest in the social conditions of freedom. 
A less-relational reading of this interest will make Rawlsians more likely share my concerns 
over Shields’ argument. If this is the case, then Shields’ view is even less attractive.
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autonomy (equality, maximization, and priority) and then rejects rival 
accounts of the relationship between autonomy and other distributive 
values (instrumentalism). After quickly dismissing egalitarian and 
maximizing principles, Shields focuses much of his argument against two 
main competitors:
1) Uniform Prioritarianism - that those who have the least autonomy 
should be prioritized with no ‘shift’ or discontinuity in the rate of 
change in our marginal reasons to promote autonomy.
Shields rejects uniform prioritarianism because: (a) it cannot plausibly 
explain qualitatively different autonomy disadvantages, and (b) it requires 
a non-arbitrary measure of autonomy that allows us to make fine-grained 
distinctions at all levels of the distribution scale. If prioritarianism is to 
distinguish itself from sufficientarianism then it must provide a uniform 
metric for the distribution of autonomy that avoids appeal to a threshold. 
Without this threshold, our metric must provide a plausible explanation of 
how we are better or worse off in terms of autonomy at points all along the 
distribution scale. Shields is rightly skeptical that such a measure exists (69).5
 2) Instrumental Welfarism - that securing sufficient autonomy is an 
important demand of justice iff it has great effects on the more 
fundamental value of welfare.
Shields rejects instrumental welfarism with a pair of counter-examples 
(74). These examples aim to show that fully instrumental accounts of the 
value of autonomy fail to capture all of our intuitions about the non-
instrumental role that the value of autonomy plays both in our lives and in 
a complete and sound theory of distributive justice. These examples 
suggest that welfarists who believe that autonomy holds purely 
instrumental value are committed to implausible conclusions, such as the 
permissibility of bypassing our deliberative capacities or shaping our 
ambitions to ensure that citizens live good lives. Even if citizens are 
guaranteed a well lived life, we should suspect that something important is 
missing in such cases.
However, crucially, Shields fails to dismiss accounts of how welfare is 
partly constituted by autonomy and so is derivatively but non-
instrumentally significant (71). We might call such views Constitutive 
Welfarism6  It is true that constitutive welfarism is compatible with Shields’ 
5 For more detail on this difficulty, see Blake (2001: 269).
6 I do not intend constitutive welfarism as the only non-instrumental justification 
of the principle of sufficient autonomy (consider, for example, a Kantian justification of the 
principle). However, I do intend it as one in a small possible set of justifications that can 
solve Shields’ objections to uniform prioritarianism in a way that doesn’t fall foul of his 
objections to instrumental welfarism.
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claim that autonomy matters non-instrumentally. These views do not deny 
that there is a non-instrumental principle of autonomy and thus do not 
challenge Shields’ arguments concerning the indispensability of the 
principle of sufficient autonomy. However, Shields must still dismiss these 
views because, although they are in agreement with his stance against 
pure instrumentalism, they compromise his arguments against uniform 
prioritarianism. They do this by explaining autonomy’s non-instrumental 
value in terms of the constitutive role that autonomssy plays in promoting 
good lives. This autonomy-sensitive notion of welfare, in turn, can provide 
a compelling metric to measure our access to autonomy that is otherwise 
missing from uniform prioritarianism.
To see this, assume that you agree that the value of autonomy plays a 
constitutive role in living a good life. If you believe this to be true, then you 
believe that some plausible account of well-being can explain the value of 
autonomy in a non-instrumental manner. For example, you might agree 
with perfectionists Joseph Raz (1986: 391) and Steven Wall (1998: 164-182) 
that the social forms of a liberal society require those who seek to live a 
good life in such a society to possess enough personal autonomy to make 
sense of the valuable options available to them. Alternatively, you might 
agree with anti-perfectionists Will Kymlicka (1989: 10-13) and Ronald 
Dworkin (2000: 267-274) that authentic endorsement has a necessary role 
to play in explaining the value of a life well lived. These arguments (and 
others) open up the conceptual space for a principle that ties notions of 
autonomy and authenticity (similar to those favored by Shields) to well-
being in a non-instrumental fashion. These principles will capture all of 
our intuitions about the non-instrumental role that the value of autonomy 
plays both in our lives and in a complete and sound theory of distributive 
justice. This explains why constitutive welfarism cannot be dismissed by 
Shields’ counter-examples. 
Troublingly, these arguments allow uniform prioritarians to appeal to 
the value of well-being (suitably conceived) as a non-arbitrary metric of 
autonomy in order to defend their view against Shields’ objections to the 
position. If you are a uniform prioritarian about welfare, then constitutive 
welfarism allows you to: (a) distinguish between qualitatively different 
disadvantages, and (b) appeal to some reasonably fine-grained metric of 
well-being in order to distribute autonomy without necessarily appealing 
to sufficientarian reasons.
Not only does constitutive welfarism evade the theoretical traps that 
Shields lays out for his competitors, it may provide some with a more 
plausible explanation of the role that autonomy should play in a just society 
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than Shields’ own narrower Rawlsian framework. As we saw in §2, the 
protection for autonomous behavior provided by Shields’ principle of 
sufficient autonomy is limited by its grounding in our interest in freedom. 
I suggested that some autonomy-minded liberals might be disappointed 
by this. This disappointment could be undercut if there are no other 
plausible alternative justifications for the principle. If this were true, then 
Shields may offer his principle as the only show in town. However, 
constitutive welfarism offers us an alternative show. This justification does 
not tie our capacities for autonomy to our interest in freedom, but instead 
ties both our capacities for autonomy and freedom to our interest in living 
good lives. While such a view may trouble Rawlsians, Shields must provide 
further counter-arguments to reject this competitor.7
4. CONCLUSION
I have offered two brief objections to Shields’ novel defense of the principle 
of sufficient autonomy. The first objection calls for Shields to broaden his 
principle in order to more robustly satisfy the interest in freedom that 
motivates his arguments, and to ultimately reconsider this motivation. 
The second objection calls for Shields to provide further justification for 
his principle in a manner that is more nuanced and more sensitive to 
competing positions. Only an argument that satisfies these challenges will 
prove the indispensability of his principle of sufficient autonomy to a 
sound and complete theory of distributive justice.
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